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THE RIGHTS OF LANDLORDS IN TENANTS' PERSONAL
PROPERTY
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Christensen v. Hoover,I filled a void in
Colorado case law by holding that an evicting landlord is not liable for damages occurring to a tenant's personal property in the process of removal and
storage. The decision was basically twofold. First, the court held that the
landlord was an "involuntary bailee" and, as such, should not be liable unless he willfully, maliciously, or through gross negligence caused the damage.
Second, it was found that a professional mover that the landlord engaged to
remove and store the property was an independent contractor, thereby releasing the landlord from any imputed negligence. The Colorado Supreme
2
Court has granted certiorari.
It is the thesis of this note that while the court in Christensen reached the
right result, the opinion was cryptic and conclusory. The decision left some
key issues unanswered and, as a precedent, has little guidance value for landlords and tenants. To what standard of care is a landlord held in respect to
the personal property of an evicted tenant? May the landlord seize and have
a lien upon the tenant's property? Although a determination of the latter
issue is implicit in the former, whether a landlord's lien exists is an issue
complex enough to merit separate treatment. Accordingly, the landlord's
standard of care is examined in detail within the facts of Chrzstensen, while
the landlord's lien is dealt with more tangentially.
THE FACTS

The plaintiff was a tenant in a house owned by the defendants, the
Hoovers. In December, 1976, the defendants commenced a forcible entry
and detainer action to regain possession of the house. 3 Judgment was entered for the Hoovers and a writ of restitution was issued. On the same day
of the judgment Mr. Hoover contracted with one Mr. Slatten, a professional
mover, to move and store the plaintiffs personal property. Messrs. Hoover
and Slatten and a deputy sheriff arrived at the premises and posted the writ.
Slatten removed all of the plaintiffs property and placed it in a storage facility where the plaintiff reclaimed it some two months later. The plaintiff
then brought an action alleging that her property had been damaged by
4
Slatten and the Hoovers when the property was removed or stored.
1. - Colo. App. -, 608 P.2d 372 (1979).
2. Id
3. Landlords in Colorado are by the forcible entry and detainer statute provided with a
procedure whereby tenants at sufferance and others can be removed from the premises and the
landlord restored to possession. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-1 15(t)(1973). In addition, although
there is a modern trend against the enforcement of private summary remedies which entail
force, see 6 A.L.R. 3d 177 (1966), the lease agreement may provide the landlord with the independent right to enter and remove the tenant and his effects using whatever reasonable force
necessary to effect the removal. Goshen v. People, 22 Colo. 270, 44 P. 503 (1896).
4. 608 P.2d at 374.
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The trial court found that $1,025 damage occurred to the plaintiff's
property in the process of being removed, transported, and stored, and that
the Hoovers had employed Slatten as their agent. The court further found
that the Hoovers and Slatten owed the plaintiff a duty of due care in the
removal and storage of the property, and that this duty had been breached.
Accordingly, a money judgment was entered jointly and severally against
Slatten and the Hoovers. 5 On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in its determination of Slatten's liability, while it re6
versed the lower court's finding that the Hoovers were liable.
I.

THE MOVER AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

The first and perhaps easiest issue before the court of appeals was
whether Slatten had acted as the Hoovers' agent or as an independent contractor. The rule controlling the court's decision was set out in Dumont v.
TeeIs 7 : Does the employer retain or have the right to control the person as to
all details of the work, or does the discretion rest solely with the person so
engaged?" The court found that Slatten and his employees had retained
total control over how the goods were removed, transported, and stored and
was, therefore, an independent contractor-not an employee or agent of the
Hoovers. Accordingly, Slatten's negligence could not be imputed to the
Hoovers. 9 Further, although the issue was neither defined nor expressly disposed of, persons who engage independent contractors have a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting the contractor.10 The court did hold,
however out of context, that the Hoovers, "by employing a professional
mover, without having any reason to believe that the mover would act irre,l Setting the trend for
sponsibly, cannot be accused of negligence ....
.. U1 WAUL....
the rest of the opinion, the court lieeiet:cu LI.L 11.. L Cc
showing the basis for its conclusion.
II.
A.

A BASIS FOR LANDLORD'S LIABILITY

Introduction

The central issue before the court of appeals was whether the landlords
were independently liable as bailees or upon some other theory based upon
the landlord-tenant relationship. In keeping with the tenor of the rest of the
opinion, the court's reasoning here was brief and without support. The court
determined that the tenant, by failing to surrender the premises,
placed the landlord in the position of having to take possession and
remove the tenant's effects so that he might regain his, the landlord's premises. The landlord, then, as an involuntary bailee,
should not be forced to bear the risk of damage to the tenant's
5. Id
6. Id
7. 128 Colo. 395, 262 P.2d 734 (1953).
8. Id at 397, 262 P.2d at 735.
9. 608 P.2d at 374 (citing Western Stock Center v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 578 P.2d
1045 (1978)).

10. Western Stock Center v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 376, 578 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1978).
11.608 P.2d at 374.
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property unless he maliciously or wilfully or through gross negligence
causes that damage.12
The court cited no other authority for this proposition than Days . Hal,13 a
1946 New York decision. Days is a short per curiam affirmance with no
recital of facts which in turn cites Ide o. Finn,' 4 an appellate division case
replete with citations but short on any firm holdings. The question becomes,
therefore, whether there is any authority in Days, Ide, or elsewhere to support
the court's finding of such a low standard of care for landlords. Specifically,
was there a bailment created when the Hoovers had the tenant's property
removed, and, if so, were they liable? Secondly, in the absence of a bailment, is a landlord independently liable for damage to an evicted tenant's
personal property? In other words, to what standard of care must a landlord
conform in removing a tenant's personal property? The issue of bailment is
dealt with first.
B.

Bailment

A bailment is a delivery of personal property by one person to another
in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express or implied, that the
property will be returned or accounted for when the specific purpose has
been accomplished or when the bailor reclaims the property.' 5 While delivery can be constructive by, for example, simply taking possession, 16 the creation of a bailment requires that possession and control over the subject
17
property pass to the bailee.
A formal creation of a bailment between the parties is not necessary.
Where a person comes into lawful possession of the personal property of another, even though there is no meeting of the minds between the property's
owner and its possessor, the possessor will become a constructive bailee when
justice so requires.' 8 Such bailments are known as constructive or involuntary bailments,' 9 and the law imposes upon the recipient the duties and obligations of a bailee. 20 In the facts of Christensen there appears to have been a
constructive bailment between Slatten and the plaintiff. Slatten came into
possession of the property through the legal process of a forcible entry and
detainer action. Further, if it is assumed that the Hoovers retained control
over the property while it was in storage, there well could have been a bailorbailee relationship between the plaintiff and the Hoovers. 2 ' However, a
12.
13.
14.
15.
Bank of
16.

Id (emphasis supplied).
67 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
196 A.D. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921).
Mayer v. Sampson, 157 Colo. 278, 281, 402 P.2d 185, 187 (1965); Simons v. First Nat'l
Denver, 30 Colo. App. 260, 262, 491 P.2d 602, 603 (1971).
Theobald v. Satterthwaite, 30 Wash. 2d 92, 190 P.2d 714 (1948).

17.
1975).
18.
19.
Grice v.
20.

Rocky Mountain Bridge Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 543 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App.
Loomis v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964).
Copelin v. Berlin Dye Works & Laundry Co., 168 Cal. 715, 721, 144 P. 961,963 (1914);
Berkner, 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923 (1921).
148 Minn. 64,180 N.W. 923 (1921); see Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So. 2d 172

(1943).
21. See generally Rocky Mountain Bridge Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 543 P.2d 1288,
1290 (Colo. App. 1975).
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finding of a bailment is not per se determinative of the issues of duty or
negligence.
The standard of care imposed upon a particular bailee depends upon
the classification into which the bailment falls. The modern test is whether
the bailment was gratuitous or for compensation. 22 The fundamental principle is the premise that upon the bailee whose labors or efforts are to go
unrewarded should rest most lightly the obligation of care. 23 If the bailment
is for hire or otherwise for the benefit of the bailee the standard of care for
either is the same:2 4 ordinary care-"that degree of care which an ordinary,
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances." ' 25 However, if
the bailment is gratuitous, the bailee is held merely to a standard of slight
care. 26 Therefore, such a bailee is liable only for gross negligence 27 or for
willful acts. 28 No matter how the bailment is characterized, if it is shown
that items are delivered to a bailee in good condition and he returns them in
a damaged condition, a presumption of negligence arises. The bailee then
would have the burden of going forward to rebut that presumption 29 by
30
showing that he met the particular standard of care imposed upon him.
Generally, a constructive trustee will receive nothing from the owner of
the property and has no right to recover anything from the owner for what
he does in caring for the property. 31 It is plain here that unlike Slatten, the
Hoovers received no compensation for having the property stored. In fact,
the Hoovers themselves paid for the property's storage. 32 Further, it appears
that the Hoovers had no right to seize and have a lien upon the tenant's
property. The trial and appellate court opinions make no reference to any
lien reserved to Hoover in the lease, nor is the renter of a house provided
with a lien in Colorado's landlord lien statute. 33 Therefore, by having the
asproperty stored, the Hoovers could hope to derive no bceefit. flune
sumed bailment-the property could not be held for security, nor would
they have a right to compensation for storage expenses. 34 Accordingly, it
seems fair to assert that the property was stored for the purpose of its safe22. Loomis v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964).
23. Id
24. Johnson v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 513, 351 P.2d 840, 841 (1960).
25. Michigan Stove Co. v. Pueblo Hardware Co., 51 Colo. 160, 165, 116 P. 340, 342 (1911).
26. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Serv., Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 437, 156
N.E.2d 121, 126 (1959); 96 A.L.R. 909 (1935).
27. Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976) (concurring opinion); Pettinelli
Motors, Inc. v. Morreale, 39 Misc. 2d 813, 242 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1963); see Carico v. Fidelity Inv.
Co., 5 Colo. App. 56, 37 P. 29 (1894).
28. 168 Ohio St. at 438, 156 N.E.2d at 126.
29. Chabot v. Williams Chevrolet Co., 30 Colo. App. 277, 491 P.2d 612 (1971) (citing
Hipps v. Hennig, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P.2d 700 (1968)).
30. See Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 610 (1891); Johnson v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 515,
351 P.2d 840, 842 (1960).
31. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Serv., Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 437, 156
N.E.2d 121, 126 (1959).
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Christensen v. Hoover, 9 CoLo. LAw. 356 (Colo.
App. 1980) (No. 78-664), cert. granted, No. 80SC46 (March 17, 1980).
33. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3) (1973). See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra.
34. 168 Ohio St. at 438, 156 N.E.2d at 126; Grice v. Berkner, 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923
(1921); see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-109 (Supp. 1978). Ide v. Finn did find, however, that

there was an implied covenant on the part of the tenant to reimburse the landlord for any
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keeping in a place where it could be and was reclaimed by the plaintiff. As
bailments for safekeeping are usually embraced within the gratuitous bailment classification, 3 5 it seems clear that the Hoovers were gratuitous bailees.
Finally, although it could be argued that the bailment, assuming it existed, was for the Hoovers' sole benefit or even for the mutual benefit of the
Hoovers and the plaintiff, such a construction seems strained. The bailments
ordinarily encompassed under the mutual benefit label (and thus for recompense) are those in which the bailee receives his compensation in the profits
of the business to which the bailment is an incident, such as where a storekeeper's customer lays aside his clothes while trying on new ones, 36 or where
goods are furnished to a person or an association for exhibition to the public. 3 7
Thus, although it is not clear how, the court in Chritensen seems to have
reached the right result on the bailment issue. The Hoovers were indeed
gratuitous, involuntary bailees and should therefore be held to a minimal
standard of care. Mr. Slatten, on the other hand, received compensation
and was appropriately held to a higher standard of ordinary care.

C.

An Independent Baszs

Implicity raised but never disposed of in the opinion was whether, regardless of the existence of a bailment between the landlord and tenant, the
landlord is independently liable for damages which occur to an evicted tenant's personal property in the process of removal. The court in Chrs-tensen
39
8
relied on Days v. Ha13 wherein is set out a "willful and wanton" standard,
but it is not very clear under what circumstances such a standard is to be
imposed. Recall that in a normal forcible entry and detainer (f.e.d.) action,
a sheriff is issued a writ of restitution, 4° and it is his duty not only to remove
41
the overstaying tenant, but also the tenant's personal property and effects.
As a practical matter, however, it may be the landlord himself or his servant
who removes the property, either alone or with the assistance of the sheriff.
As for acts of the sheriff, a landlord generally is not liable for the manner in which the sheriff executes the writ unless either the landlord has directed its execution 42 or the writ is irregular, unauthorized, or void. 43 Mere
participation with the sheriff is not treated as direction. One case cited with
approval in Ide held that a landlord in a dispossess action who, at the constaexpenses incurred in removing the property from the premises. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at
209.
35. Slack v. Bryan, 299 Ky. 132, 184 S.W.2d 873 (1945); Acme Ribbon Mills, Inc. v. City
of New York, 30 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1941), af'd 266 A.D. 656, 41 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1943).
36. 1 A.L.R.2d 802 (1948).
37. Kay County Free Fair Ass'n v. Martin, 190 Okla. 225, 122 P.2d 393 (1942); see Johnson
v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 351 P.2d 840 (1960)..
38. 67 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
39. Id at 239.
40. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-115(1) (1973). See note 3 supra.
41. Miller v. White, 80 Ill. 580 (1875); Ide v. Finn, 196 A.D. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921).
See note 3 supra.
42. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 209 (citing with approval Jansen v. Bernard, 12 N.Y.
Wkly. Dig. 499); see Rosenfield v. Barnett, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 64 S.W. 944 (1901).
43. 196 A.D. at 314-15, 187 N.Y.S. at 210.
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ble's request, helped remove the tenant's property to a sidewalk during a
rainstorm was not liable unless he acted maliciously or willfully. 4 4 This language was perhaps the basis for the holding offDays.
If a directing landlord is to be held "liable for the unlawful acts of the
constable," 4 5 to what standard of care is the landlord held? To begin, the
sheriff or constable himself is held to a fairly low standard:
an officer armed with such a writ [of restitution] can enter forcibly,
in order to execute it . . . and . . . it is his duty to remove
whatever chattels or property may be in the house, doing as little
damage as possible-no more than is necessary to effect the purpose, and which would be the natural consequence of a hasty removal. By the writ, the landlord is to be put in full possession...
of the premises only, divested of such property as may be found
therein. Should the officer wantonly injure the chattel property, he
46
would be liable to the extent of the injury.
47
Since the negligence of the sheriff is sought to be imputed to the landlord,
it seems reasonable to hold the landlord to the sheriffs standard of care:
some degree of care in excess of wantonness. There are additional reasons to
impose a relatively low standard on the landlord. First, it is primarily the
duty of the tenant to remove his own property. 48 Second, it is the duty of a
tenant whose personal property has been removed under a writ of restitution
to use his best efforts to protect it from damage. 49 Given these duties, it is
the view of this writer that even if the landlord alone removes the property,
in a legal entry with reasonable notice to the tenant, it is equitable to require
of the landlord only that he not willfully or maliciously damage the tenant's
property. While this issue has not been clearly determined in any decision,
especially in Christensen, a lower standard of care for an evicting landlord
seems reasonable and fair. It will be up to the Colorado Supreme Court,
however, to make this determination.
III.

THE LANDLORD'S LIEN

As Christensen illustrates, in any eviction proceeding there is raised the
question of what rights and responsibilities a landlord has in the tenant's
personal property. Although it was not broached in the Christensen opinion,
the landlord's lien is a central right in the landlord-tenant relationship. A
determination of the existence of a landlord's lien is crucial to fully assess the
rights and obligations of the parties in the tenant's personal property. The
significance of a finding of a landlord's lien extends beyond the mere fact
that the landlord would then have the rent obligation secured in his favor.
Should the landlord seize the tenant's personal property to enforce the lien, a
44. Id (citing Higenbothem v. Lowenbein, 28 How. Prac. 221 (1864), "The law does not
[in dispossess actions] recognize the state of the weather." .1d at 223). Ide had previously cautioned, however, that property's removal to the street and alley "could only be justified under
the warrant." Id at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 208.
45. Id at 314, 187 N.Y.S. at 210.
46. Miller v. White, 80 11. 580, 584 (1875) (emphasis supplied); see 56 A.L.R. 1039 (1928).
47. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).

48. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 208.
49. Przybylski v. Remus, 207 Il. App. 106, 108 (1917).
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bailment would be created. Moreover, since the landlord would obviously
derive some benefit out of the bailment, he would not be a gratuitous bailee.
His standard of care toward the property would therefore be considerably
higher than if he had simply had the chattels carried away and stored to be
freely reclaimed by the tenant. The following. section is intended to survey
this very important lien.
At common law, a landlord had no lien upon any property of his tenant
as security for rent. However, the landlord did have the right to distress 5° or
seize the tenant's personal property found on the demised premises and hold
it without sale until the rent was paid. 5 1 To the extent that the landlord
actually seized the goods and was in possession of the goods, he acquired a
peculiar right in the distressed property which was in the nature of security.5 2 This right to distress has never existed in the State of Colorado.53
While the first legislature of the territory of Colorado adopted the common law of England, it limited its adoption to laws "of a general nature, and
all acts and statutes of the British Parliament made in aid of or to supply the
defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First."' 54 Herr
v. Johnson5 5 found that a landlord's right of distraint under the English law
did not arise until after the fourth year of the reign of James J.56 Accordingly, to determine whether a landlord has the right to distress or have a lien
upon a tenant's personal property, one must look to the lease agreement
between the parties5 7 or any statutory provision.
Colorado landlords and innkeepers have been provided with a statutory
lien upon their tenants' personal property found on the premises for the
amount of any unpaid board, lodging, or rent, as well as for any reasonable
costs incurred in enforcing the lien, not including legal expenses. 58 The
landlord lien encompasses household furniture, appliances, and other personal property. Certain items, such as cooking utensils, necessary clothing,
and the tenants' personal effects, are excluded. The landlord may peaceably
59
enter the premises and seize any property subject to the lien.
50. Morgan v. Campbell, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 381, 391 (1874).
51.

62 A.L.R. 1106, 1107 (1929),

52. Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631, 638 (1912).
53. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 18 P. 342 (1888).
54. 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws (codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (1973)).
55. 11 Colo. 393, 18 P. 342 (1888).
56. Id at 395, 18 P. at 343.
57. A.B.R. Distrib., Inc. v. Sterling Properties, 161 Colo. 460, 423 P.2d 1 (1967); Illinois
Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 401, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932). Illinozs Bldg. Co. suggested
that while a landlord's lien reserved in the lease agreement was to be recognized and enforced, it
was to be treated as a chattel mortgage and as such controlled by the provisions of Colorado's
chattel mortgage act as to recordation. Id, 15 P.2d at 702. However, the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) now stipulates that its secured transactions provisions do not apply to landlord's
liens. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-104(b) (Supp. 1978).
58. CoIL. REv. STAT. § 38-20-101 to -116 (Supp. 1978).
59. CoLO.REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3) (1973), in relevant part, provides:
(3)(a) Any person who rents furnished or unfurnished rooms or apartments for the
housekeeping purposes of his tenants, as well as the keeper of a trailer court who rents
trailer space, shall have a lien upon the tenant's personal property that is then on or in
the rental premises. The value of the lien shall be for the amount of unpaid board,
lodging, or rent, and for reasonable costs incurred in enforcing the lien, not including
attorney fees. The lien shall be upon the household furniture, goods, appliances, and
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As any statutory creation of a right in landlords to distress or to impose
a lien is in derogation of Colorado's common law, it must be strictly construed. 60 For example, in Morse v. Mornson,6 1 an innkeepers lien provision
that "[t]he keeper of any hotel, tavern or boarding house, or any person who
rents furnished or unfurnished rooms, shall have a lien upon the baggage
and furniture of his or her patrons . ."62 was denied application to a lessor
of an office who sought to impose a lien on the lessee's office equipment and
furniture. 63 Accordingly, in the absence of an agreement, if a particular
landlord-tenant relationship has not been provided for the statute, the landlord has no right to seize and have a lien upon the tenant's chattels.
While the landlord's lien statute appears to be an outgrowth of the English common law of distraint, it differs in a very important respect-it gives
the lienor the right to sell the seized property. The statute provides a
mandatory procedure for the sale and disposal of goods seized and on which
a statutory lien is given. 64 Thirty days after the charges for which a lien
arises under the statute become due and payable, the lienor "may file a foreclosure action in the county, superior, or district court of the county or city
and county in which the contract or agreement between the lienholder and
the owner of the property was signed or entered into." 65 If the lienholder
does not commence a judicial action to foreclose the lien within sixty days
after the charges become due and payable, the lien will terminate. 66 Providing the lienor receives a judgment, he may sell the property at a public auction after giving ten days prior notice. Such notice may be given by
publication, or, under some circumstances, by mail to the chattel owner's
"usual place of abode."' 67
('n2,lrb'q Inncllnrei lien Rtntittf e n t 1-_.t --

Mabyncnttt:n]n

sofar as it creates a right in the landlord to seize a tenant's property without
other personal property of the tenant and members of his household then being upon
the rental premises, but exclusive of small kitchen appliances, cooking utensils, beds,
bedding, necessary wearing apparel, personal or business records and documents, and
the personal effects of the tenant and the members of his household.
(b) In the event the tenant has vacated the premises, the landlord shall allow
the tenant and members of his household access to the premises at any reasonable time
and in a reasonable manner to remove any property not covered by the lien.
(c) In the event the tenant has not vacated the premises, the landlord or his
agent may enter upon the premises at any reasonable time for the purpose of asserting
the lien and, in a reasonable manner and peaceably, the landlord may assert dominion
over the personal property covered by the lien. Assertion of the lien provided in this
section in a manner which substantially interferes with the tenant's right to reasonably
occupy and enjoy the premises is unlawful and shall cause forfeiture of the lien and
shall give rise to an action for damages.
60. See McKee Livestock Co. v. Menzel, 70 Colo. 308, 310, 201 P. 52, 53 (1921); Scanlan v.
LaCoste, 59 Colo. 449, 149 P. 835 (1915).
61. 16 Colo. App. 449, 66 P. 169 (1901).
62. Id at 170.
63. Id at 169.
64. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107 (Supp. 1978). A tenant has a cause of action against
his landlord-lienor who does not follow this procedure; however, an exception is made for abandoned property. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
65. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(1) (Supp. 1978).

66. Id
67. CoLO. REV.

STAT.

§ 38-20-109(1) (Supp. 1978).
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a prior hearing. 68 As there is no common law right of landlords in Colorado
to seize the tenant's property, 69 any such action under a state-created right
could be viewed as state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The right to a prior hearing attaches to the deprivation of property interests encompassed within the
fourteenth amendment's protection. 70 Although the tenant could institute a
replevin or trespass action for damages or for the return of the goods and
ultimately prevail, 7 ' and despite the fact that the tenant could prevail at the
hearing provided for under Colorado law, 72 even a "temporary, nonfinal
deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 73 The "Court has not . . . embraced the general
' 74
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
The tenant's personal property upon which the landlord holds a lien
will not always be valuable enough to warrant the expense of a foreclosure
action and sale. After a tenant in arrears has left or been forcibly removed
from the premises, 75 he may have left behind personal property that is essen68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3)(c) (1973).
69. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 395, 18 P. 342, 343 (1888).
70. A possessory interest in chattels is within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
71. Wilde v. Rawles, 13 Colo. 583, 22 P. 897 (1889); Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531, 131 P.
386 (1913).
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-108 (Supp. 1978).
73. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972); see Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 339 (1969).
The Fuentes Court held that by not providing for prior notice and a "meaningful" opportunity to be heard prior to the property's seizure, the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida and
Pennsylvania violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments in that they worked a deprivation
without due process of law. 407 U.S. at 96. While the statutes involved in Fuentes and Sniadach

can be distinguished from Colorado's in that they involved the actions of constables, court
clerks, and other agents of the state, a Colorado landlord would have, in the absence of an
agreement, no right to seize a tenant's property without the state statute. In Hall v. Garson, 468
F.2d. 845 (5th Cir. 1972), the court, citing Fuentes and Sntadach, struck down Texas's landlord
lien statute which was very similar to Colorado's. Specifically, the court found that because the
statute clothed "the apartment owner with the clear statutory authority to enter" and seize the
property, the landlord's action became that of the state. 468 F.2d at 848. See Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1945).
Although the Court has permitted prehearing seizures in "extraordinary situations," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971), "[t]hese situations, however, must be truly unusual" and necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest which
demands very prompt action. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91. To illustrate, summary seizure of
property has been permitted to collect the internal revenue of the United States, Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931), and to meet the exigencies of a national war effort,
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1922).
Finally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1941), Congress has created a cause of action against any
person who "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,"
deprives another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws..
" A Colorado tenant's cause of action under this section seems clear: under the aegis
of a state-created right, a landlord has deprived the tenant of the possession of his property
without the procedural due process recognized in Fuentes. In Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972), it was held that a landlord who summarily evicted a tenant and seized his
property as permitted under Florida's landlord lien statute acted under "color of state law"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, given the dim view taken of statutes
providing for summary landlord action, a Colorado landlord would be well-advised to provide
for a separate lien in the lease agreement.
74. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
75. CoL. REV. STAT. § 13-40-101 (1973); see note 3 supra.
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tially worthless. Furthermore, by seizing the tenant's property pursuant to
the landlord's lien statute, 76 the landlord may find himself in possession of
chattels of little resale value. Under these circumstances, or even if the landlord finds himself in the possession of valuable property, the landlord is not
required to commence an action to foreclose his lien if the property has been
77
abandoned.
Property is presumed to be abandoned if its owner has failed to contact
the lienholder "for a period of not less than thirty days" 7 8 and the lienholder
has no reason to believe that the property owner does not intend to abandon
his chattels. 79 Here the statute seems to leave the means of disposal to the
discretion of the landlord: "[a]t least fifteen days prior to sell'ng or otherwise
disposing of abandoned property, the lienholder shall notify the owner of the
"80 Therefore, a landlord will
proposedmanner and date of disposition ...
likely be within his rights to dispose of abandoned property by informal sale
or even destruction. Furthermore, the landlord can dispose of abandoned
property at his convenience as the sixty-day limit relates only to the commencement of required foreclosure proceedings for nonabandoned property.8 1 Finally, as to both contractual and statutory liens on property, it is
axiomatic that the lienor, subject only to the sixty-day limit where applicable, 8 2 may simply retain the property until the tenant pays the debt upon
which the lien is based. Such payment will extinguish the lien, 8 3 and termi84
nate the landlord's right to retain the property.
A landlord seeking to foreclose or otherwise enforce a statutory or contractual lien upon a tenant's chattels should be aware of some of the issues
concerning the priority of competing lienholders in the same property. Colorado's landlord lien provisions are silent as to priorities8 5 and there is not an
overabundance of Colorado case law on the subject. However, at least in
other jurisdictions, a landlord's lien is superior to other liens, including judgments acquired upon the property subsequent to its being brought upon the
premises, and it may ordinarily be enforced against all but prior liens and
bona fide purchases without notice. 86 For example, a statutory lien was held
76. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3)(c) (1973).
77. CoL. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
78. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-106 (Supp. 1978).

79. Id For purposes of the lien and the right to dispose of the abandoned property, it
probably is not necessary that the personal property have been left behind by a tenant in arrears. A former tenant, by abandoning property on the premises, becomes a tenant at sufferance and such property thereby is subject to the landlord's lien. Cabre v. Brown, 355 So.2d 846,
847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
80. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-20-116(2) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
81. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
82. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(1) (Supp. 1978).
83. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(2) (1973).
84. See gnerally Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949); Henson v.
Henson, 151 Tenn. 137, 149, 268 S.W. 378, 381 (1921).
85. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1978) does, however, stipulate priority for
agistor's liens.
86. See Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.), cert. detied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968);
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Boymann, 155 N.J. Super. 120, 382 A.2d 437 (1977); In re
Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 31 A.D.2d 895, 297 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
Statutory liens, Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 695, 21 So.2d 361, 364 (1945), as well as
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superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant in certain commercial
87
showcases and fixtures after this property was brought upon the premises.
Analogously, a contractual lien is normally inferior to the rights of the tenant's prior conditional vendor of the subject chattel. 88 The result could be
less predictable, however, if the prior party's security interest was not properly perfected.8 9
Because the Uniform Commercial Code provisions on secured transactions as adopted in Colorado do not apply to landlord's liens (apparently of
any kind) 9° the priorities between a prior party with an unperfected security
interest and the landlord-lienor are unclear. 9 ' Illinois Building Co. v. Patterson, 92 however, offers an interesting parallel in resolving priorities between a
prior conditional vendor and a landlord. Unlike today where security inter93
ests are governed by Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, when
Illinois Building Co. was decided (1932) a conditional vendor had to conform
with the recordation and other provisions of Colorado's chattel mortgage
act. 94 The court held that by clothing the tenant with indicia of ownership
in the chattels, the conditional vendor will be denied the right to assert his
ownership to the landlord. The court reasoned that because the vendor had
not given notice of his ownership by proper recordation, the landlord should
be entitled to the protection and priority given to creditors who have relied
95
For
to their detriment upon a conditional vendee's apparent ownership.
purposes of the Code's application in a priority dispute with a landlord's
lien, it is significant that the court in Illinois Building Co. treated the landlord
as a creditor insofar as the Code stipulates that unperfected security interests
are inferior to persons who become "lien creditors" without knowledge of the
security interest. 96 A "lien creditor" is defined to be a "creditor who has
acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like
...
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This language clearly suggests that a landlord who seizes a ten-

ant's property without knowledge of a prior unperfected interest in that
property would have a lien superior to any such prior lien. Accordingly,
while this section is a cursory examination of priorities, a landlord at first
blush would have a substantial position from which to challenge a prior unperfected interest in the property seized by the landlord, and would be welladvised in most situations to seize the property before unknown prior interests can be perfected.
contractual liens, A.B.R. Distrib., Inc. v. Sterling Properties, 161 Colo. 460, 423 P.2d 1 (1967),
are superior to judgments.
87. Dewar v. Hagans, 61 Ariz. 201, 146 P.2d 208 (1944); see Beall v. White, 94 U.S. 382,

386 (1876).
88. Beebe v. Fouse, 27 N.M. 194, 198, 199 P. 364, 366 (1921).
89. See Illinois Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 399, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 4-9-301 (1973).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-104(b) (Supp. 1978).
91. Ste d. § 4-9-312 (1973).
92. 91 Colo. 391, 15 P.2d 699 (1932).
93. CLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-102 (1973).
94. Illinois Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 399, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932).
95. Id at 405, 15 P.2d at 705.
96. CLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-301(l) (1973).
97. Id. § 4-9301(3).
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CONCLUSION

This note surveys the central issues that relate to a tenant's personalty.
Most of the propositions set forth here rest upon decisions from jurisdictions
other than Colorado. These cases, while largely of an early vintage and
without the binding effect of Colorado holdings, do provide an adequate
source of precedent to define this area of landlord-tenant law in Colorado.
The rights and duties of landlords and tenants in tenants' personal
property have yet to be clearly defined in Colorado, or, for that matter, in
any other jurisdiction. The Chr'stensen v. Hoover opinion, as it now stands,
does little to clarify this uncertainty. While the opinion suggests more issues
than it settles, in all fairness it does serve as a convenient portal to further
inquiry by the Colorado Supreme Court. Hopefully the court will take advantage of this opportunity to set some definite guidelines for landlords and
tenants.
James E Gtgax

